Even we human cannot solve the frame problem, that is, we cannot completely describe conditions for a certain action to succeed, nor can we completely predict what will happen as the result of an action. Nevertheless, in daily life we can act as if there were no such problem, because we use some heuristics to bypass it. In this paper, we propose that the concept of causality is the heuristics. We also claim that temporal ordering in causal relation is not essential. Any partial ordering suces but once the order is xed, it should be followed even in reverse order reasoning such as inferring past from future. We formalize causal reasoning and apply it to YSP.
Introduction
In a formal description of actions and changes, there is diculty known as the frame problem [MH69] . It is practically impossible to describe (or infer) all necessary preconditions and all possible consequences of an action. Our observation shows that even we human cannot solve the frame problem [HM90] . We behave as if there were no such problem, though. The key is the use of some heuristics [HM91] .
We observe that there are two kinds of non-monotonicity in the reasoning of changes: one due to lack of information, the other due to change itself. Traditionally, situation calculus with non-monotonic logics are used to attack the frame problem. Two kinds of monotonicity are mixed in those formalisms. It is mainly due to the framework of situation calculus, which is essentially a schema to map dynamic changes into static logical framework. The non-monotonicity due to change was then embedded into the non-monotonicity due to lack of information.
In our formalism, we separate them. Non-monotonic reasoning is used for change of information, causality is used to change of states. We will claim that the notion of causality is the heuristics to solve the frame problem. We will apply a theory of causality to Yale shooting problem (YSP) [HM86] . Our theory of causality is unique in the following aspects: (1) no temporal order is assumed, (2) no global notion of consistency is required.
Causality
The notion of causality has been playing important roles not only in the theory of human cognition, but also in the design of practical systems. For example, CASNET [SCSA78] has built-in knowledge of causality among various factors of the disease and its symptoms to make the diagnosis proper. Another example can be found in an explanation based learning system [YT89] , in which causality is used to suppress generation of unnecessary macro operators.
The general requirement of causality, which is also seen in the above systems, is that \the result does not precede the cause". Shoham states that the above requirement is necessary to make our reasoning ecient [Sho90] . The requirement allows the reasoning process (his attention is on the non-monotonic reasoning) to proceed in temporal order. It is the economy of our cognitive process which requires the notion of causality. His claim is practically correct because in our world it is true that no results precede the cause. However, our imagination can go further than the real life. For example, in time travel, the temporal order cannot be used to sort out events. A time traveller is in the past because he left the future rst (in whatever the meaning of \rst").
Our claim here is that the requirement of temporal order in causal relation is too strong. Partial ordering over the application of causal relations (not the ordering over applied status, but over the application) suces. This position is justied because in some areas, the causal relation does not involve the concept of time at all. One example is found in the model of reective computational models. Reection is dened as \causally connected self representation" [Smi84] in which the following two constraints are imposed over a program P and its abrepresentation MP (we will use \ c )" to denote \causes" whose denition is given later) :
Even when the notion of time is introduced, it does not preclude the changes occurring at the same time.
Even if the notion of causality allows that the cause and the eect take place at the same time, it at least precludes that the eect precedes the cause. A proper theory of causality must explain why this is the case. We conjecture that the notion of causality has nothing but cognitive value. It has been developed because the notion is useful when an agent makes plans, say, for survival or to control its environment.
When an agent cannot be in the desired state directly, it must use some indirect means to realize the state. Causality is used to reason about this. For example, causality like turning on the heater causes the room temperature to rise eating causes the stomach to become full are used to make a room warmer, or to reduce hunger. By using those rules, an agent can reason that it should turn on the heater when it feels cold. As discussed in many places, those causal relations are not logical implication. The cause is neither necessary nor sucient condition for the eect. is not called the cause. In short, controllability of events is the key concept in causality. In our physical world, if the cause temporarily follows the eect, it cannot be used to control the situation. This temporal requirement is, however, inessential to the notion of causality. It happens to be the necessary condition for causality in our physical world. Causality has wider application as stated earlier. In those areas, some other partial order is used, since there may be no concept of time in the area, as in reection.
When causal relations (written as \ to predict what happens. Therefore, some kind of partial order is required. Although the partial order must be compatible with temporal order in our physical world, temporal order is not a prerequisite of the theory developed here. Furthermore, the partial order is not explicitly mentioned in the theory. It is implicit in how causal relations are used for reasoning.
Partial Ordering and Local Consistency Maintenance
Causal relations are non-monotonic in accumulation. Consistency maintenance is an important issue in non-monotonic reasoning in general. In conventional approaches like TMS [Doy78] and ATMS [dK85] , the task requires global computation: When a contradiction is derived, the culprit may not be the very rule which directly derived the contradiction. A (potentially large) set of assumptions must be inspected. In default logic [Rei80] , the situation is worse in that consistency check must be done over the whole model. In either case, their global nature requires large amount of computation/memory and are not adequate for a model of human reasoning. Since the notion of causality is accompanied with partial order, this ordering provides information on which assumption to revise, and enables the system to maintain consistency only with local computation. A rule later applied override the previous ones [Nak90a] . This observation veries Shoham's claim that with temporal ordering, the reasoning system can compute state change along the temporal order to make computation ecient.
The Frame Problem
When rst pointed out by McCarthy and Hayes [MH69] , the frame problem was posited as a problem of how to eciently describe change of state due to actions of some agent. The diculty in describing state change is that the description tends to be very huge: when there are n actions and m states, one must describe rules on n 2 m combinations. The amount of description explodes exponentially. 1 To solve the frame problem, one must be able to do at least two things. The rst is to say something like`everything else remains unchanged,' in order to minimize the description about the things that do not change. This notion introduces non-monotonicity, when one fails to conclude that something changes due to lack of information. The other is to minimize the description about the things that do change. For instance, STRIPS [FN71] meets the former requirement by introducing some procedural feature. That is, in STRIPS actions have side eects of rewriting the states of the world. Such a procedural method tend to become too complicated, as discussed already, and the latter requirement is not satised. Sandewall proposes UNLESS operator [San72] by which to satisfy the former requirement in a framework of symbolic logic. Since a logic is declarative in general, the latter requirement is far better met in such a setting than in the procedural framework of STRIPS. This line of research has given rise to a number of so-called non-monotonic logics, including default logic [Rei80] , non-monotonic logic [NML80] , circumscription [McC80] , etc.
YSP [HM86, Sat88] is then presented as a problem of non-monotonic reasoning [HK89] . Proper solution of YSP requires ability to compute not only consistent, but also preferable set of assumptions.
Non-monotonic logics do not distinguish two apparently dierent notions: causal relations and logical relations. We claim that this is the source of YSP, and by introducing the notion of causality, we can solve 2 the problem together with the frame problem.
When reasoning about action and situation change, it is essential to distinguish causal and logical relations. The former is unidirectional, i.e., rules have ordering between the cause and the result as described earlier. Logical rules, on the other hand, describe static relation between the antecedent and the consequent, and thus are bidirectional, as physical rules. They can be used in both directions: P ! Q can be used to infer Q from P , or to infer :P from :Q. Ohsawa et [ON91] developed a theory of action in which primary (causal) and secondary (logical) relations are distinguished.
The distinction becomes crucial in non-monotonic reasoning. For example, let us consider a rule \those with wings y". When interpreted as expressing a causality, this rule means \when you attach wings to non-ying object, it becomes yable". The action of attaching a wing causes non-monotonicity to the property of ying.
When the same rule is interpreted as expressing a logical rule, and applied to an object x known not to y (: y(x)) the rule cannot be used to make y(x) to hold. Rather, the implication, winged(x)!y(x), together with winged(x) and : y(x) introduces logical contradiction. To avoid this rigidity of ordinary logic, non-monotonic logics are invented. In non-monotonic logics, rules are weakened to cope with partial information. In circumscription, for instance, predicate is introduced to cope with increased information and the rule is expressed as winged(x)^:ab(x) ! y(x) When only winged(x) is known, unless ab(x) is proved, x is concluded to y. But when, with some additional information, ab(x) becomes provable, x is now concluded not to y. In another case where : y(x) is known, ab(x) is proved to be true. Note that there is no notion of change; only additional information.
The frame problem is associated with the notion of change. Thus it is related to causality, not to static, logical description of the world. Furthermore, the notion of causality is developed for a cognitive agent to control its environment. In this sense, an agent can have any causal rules. It is simply a matter whether the agent can survive, not whether the rule is correct. Agents can survive only when those rules agent possesses are coherent with the environment. We human seem not to suer from the frame problem because our causal rules are attuned to the world.
When an agent makes a plan to achieve a goal, it will invoke some (not all) of its knowledge about causal relations. The range of knowledge involved depends on the situation. Here we will assume the following:
hypothesis 1 Only positive ow of causality toward a goal is considered.
For example, in YSP viewed from the assassin, the goal is to kill the target and get free:
goal: kill, escape. The assassin may involve knowledge about ice-made bullet to erase the evidence. But (s)he may not consider about bullet proof vest, because it is not positively connected to the goal.
For secret service agent in charge of protecting the target, on the other hand, whose goal is goal: not dead, will consider putting a bullet proof vest on the target, but may not consider the material of the bullet because the agent cannot control it.
There are of course very careful assassin and secret service agent who consider both bullet proof vest and the material of the bullet. It just depends on the planning mode of them and information they have. When an assassin knows that there are protective agents, the assassin will shift into more careful mode of planning, where (s)he may consider negative causality to his/her goal. There are many possibilities for setting up the environment for planning, and there are priorities among rules involved.
hypothesis 2 The reasoning process ows only in one direction determined by the partial order of causal relations.
In the following, we will use temporal order as the ordering among causes and results. But we want to again state that any partial ordering is as good as temporal ordering, when one reasons along causality.
Temporal order is used as follows (here we are assuming that the agent knows what action took place): 1. When an agent reasons from the cause to results, since this matches the partial order, the rule is applied to a state to compute the resulting state. 2. When an agent reasons from the result to the cause, on the other hand, it is not so straightforward.
One must assume the previous state and apply the causal relation forward to see if the result matches the known state. It is worthwhile to note here that the temporal order used is not the order of the events, but the order of application of causal rules. Although those two ordering meet in our daily life, there are cases they do not. Suppose an agent travels backward through time and kills his own father. Although the assassination takes place before the agent starts the travel, the reasoning process should take place in another order: travel followed by the assassination.
Theory of Causality

Situation Theory
The formalization of causality in this paper is based on situation theory advocated by Barwise. We present here a simple sketch of the theory 3 .
In the theory, there is a set of relations, a set of objects, and the set f0; 1g of polarities. Information in a situation is represented as a set of infons, which are composed of a relation, some objects, and a polarity. Let R be an n-ary relation, O i (i=1,..,n) any objects, and P a polarity, then hhR;O 1 ; ::; O n ; P ii is an infon. If P is 1, the infon is called a positive infon, and represents positive information such as \Socrates is a man". If P is 0, it is called a negative infon, and represents negative information such as \penguins can not y". The dual of an infon is the infon which diers from only in polarities. One of the essential ideas of situation theory is that situations are objects and they support infons (or infons hold in situations). Let s be a situation and an infon, then the following expression represents the proposition that s supports :
This notion is essentially the same as hold(; s) in situation calculus. For example, the capital of the USA is Washington, D. C. in 1992. Thus, the situation earth 1992 supports the infon that the capital of the USA is Washington, D. C.: earth 1992 j = hhcapital, USA, Washinton,D.C.; 1ii 4 3 See [Bar89] for further details about situation theory, and [NPS91] for how to use it in reasoning. 4 In the case of positive infons, the polarities may be omitted.
Situations are used in wide sense in our formalization. For instance, knowledge spaces of agents are also treated as situations.
We will also write s j = 6
where 6 is a set of infons i 8 2 6:s j = When there are several positive and negative causal relations to the same action applicable, the reasoning system must choose one of them. This is non-monotonic reasoning itself. In our approach, it is solved locally, i.e., only from information from the current status (S 1 in denition 1) and the rules. Since normal techniques of non-monotonic reasoning apply here, we do not go into the details in this paper. Only it should be noted that this process is kept local in contrast to other approaches which invoke global minimization.
Let Axiom 2 corresponds to the frame axiom. In other words, when an infon holds in a situation, it holds in the next situation unless any causal relations prevent the situation from supporting it. RESULT from holding). Describing causality in our formalization circumvents the problem arising from the requirement to describe all preconditions for actions. Prediction of the future state depends on a set of causal relations, which are not necessarily correct. Therefore, there is no guarantee that each result of inference corresponds correctly to the real world. The problem of describing complete preconditions for actions in the frame problem appears only when you try to have the complete description of the world, which even we human cannot do. It should be noted that the other agents may have the latter class of causal relations, but they usually do not make use of them.
As you may notice, preconditions dier in the above two causal relations of \dead". The described information in each relation is related to the positive or negative goal of killing, that is, causal relations are described intentionally.
Let us consider the following actions under the above assumptions:
,A] t3 There are two dierent logical extensions in YSP, depending on the priority between \alive" and \loaded". One of the essential problems is that there are not any criteria of which solutions are preferable. In our formalization, either of them is clearly selected in an agent as a result of only using the causal relations relative to the goal of the agent. Therefore the SP concludes \dead", because \bullet-proof" which prevents him from deducing \dead" does not hold at t0 (or, at least SP does not know of it). On the other hand, the killer concludes \alive" and fails to kill, because he knows of \ice" which prevents him from deducing \loaded". The dierence of conclusions comes from the following two reasons:
1. the SP does not have the information that the bullet is made from ice, and 2. he does not have the causal relation exploiting the information even if he knows about the material of the bullet. The same conclusion would be reached even if we make t0 j = hhice,bullet1ii as knowledge of the killer's own, and hhice,yii!' [wait] c 6 ) hhloaded,x,yii as public knowledge.
The criteria of preference in our formalization are as follows:
1. inference is carried out in the order of actions, and 2. dierent agents have dierent causal rules.
One of the essential problems of YSP is that even if you could solve YSP with a certain preference completely, there would be some modied versions of YSP which you could not utterly solve with the same preference. The reason for the failure is that the parts which should be treated as rules relative to each problems are xed in the mechanism of inference in non-monotonic logics approaches. In our formalization, descriptions of causality change as problems change. A xed strategy of inference is unnecessary. We represent actions with a partial order, and inference is controlled by the description of causality.
It is necessary to draw an inference in the reverse order of time when you solve some complicated problems. You should always draw an inference in the order of causality if you deliberate causality. In YSP, the order is accidentally the same as the order of time. Uranus [Nak90b] draws an inference in order of time in principle, and the problems of inferring some past states from the current state are reduced into an inference in order of time. For instance, in the case of inferring \not loaded" from the information of \alive" in the nal state t3, Uranus examines the possibility of \alive" in t3 on the supposition that \loaded" holds in t2. The supposition is considered true if \alive" holds in t3. Otherwise, the supposition is refuted.
7 Related Works 7.1
In General
There are too many related works to cite here. Before we go into the details, let us make some general comments. Approaches based on situation calculus and non-monotonic logics do not distinguish two kinds of non-monotonicity: one due to lack of information, the other due to change itself. It is mainly due to the framework of situation calculus, which is essentially a schema to map dynamic changes into static logical framework. Non-monotonicity due to change was then mapped into non-monotonicity due to lack of information. In our formalism, we separate them. Non-monotonic reasoning is used for change of information, causality is used to change of states. As pointed out in section 3 and 5, however, causal relations on the same action need non-monotonic reasoning. In our formalism, these two kinds of non-monotonicity do not interfere each other. In our YSP example, SP has two causal relations on [shoot(x,a)], one leading to dead, the other preventing it. Preference of those rules is computed without any consideration on the resulting state.
Our approach based on causality uses situation theory as a basis of formalization. Situation theory is similar to situation calculus in that they both treat situation dependent properties (called \infon" in situation theory and \uent" in situation calculus). In situation theory, and particularly in our approach, however, situations are independent to each other. There is no global notion of minimization over all situations. This enables us to divide logical and causal relations. Logical consistency is imposed only within each situations. 6 Baker's approach [Bak89] is closer to situation theory at heart although his framework is based on situation calculus. His approach relies on having a set of locally consistent situations.
Within those mixed (causal and logical) approaches, some other standard should be given to select proper extension from many logically equal ones. Shoham [Sho88] used \chronologically maximal ignorance" as such preference. This favors extensions with minimal change along temporal order.
But chronological minimization cannot be applied to reason backward. When you nd your car is stolen after the action sequence [park-car; wait; wait], it is unnatural to assume that the car was stolen after the second wait, not the rst wait [Kau86, Bak89] .
Shanahan explains it by abduction. [Sha82] The distinction between deduction and abduction here is essentially the same as our distinction of direction (as partial order).
Causality
Haugh [Hau87] and Lifschitz [Lif87] proposed approaches to YSP based on causal minimization. Causal relations are explicitly written and those without explicit cause (like being loaded) remains the same. Haugh postulates two kinds of causality: potential-cause and determined-cause, and Lifschitz has two kinds of uent: primitive and non-primitive. However, those approaches still do not clearly distinguish causal relations from logical relations (they do not allow logical relations to begin with) and do not minimize them separately. Their division is applied, so to speak, in a wrong place. The stolen car problem mentioned above also imposes a problem on those approaches. Since things cannot change without explicit causal relation, one must have a rule like \waiting causes a car be stolen". In that case, the car will be stolen twice in both wait actions. In our approach, this non-monotonicity can be absorbed as lack of information.
Shoham [Sho90] developed more elaborate theory of causality. Moreover, he separates causality and non-monotonicity of knowledge. But he takes temporal order as a prerequisite of causality and uses temporal logic to represent it. This limits the application area of his theory. Our approach can equally be applied to causal relation with out temporal notion as discussed in, for instance, Iwasaki and Simon [IS86] . When we regard [infer] as an action, and use temporal logic to describe mental states, then Shoham's formalism may be mapped into ours.
Conclusion
We used the notion of causality as a key to the frame problem. In particular, 1. Only causal rules positively related to the goal is used. 2. The order or inference is important. 3. Causal rules are unidirectional. When a causal rule is applied, even when we know the result, it is wrong to apply it in the reverse order (as in the case of contraposition).
Causal rules are cognitive one. It reects our understanding of the world. It therefore reects an agent's recognition of the problem domain. Slight change of the problem may aect the recognition, and then the representation of the rules.
By loosening the requirement of temporal order to any partial order, the theory of causality has wider application area. Partial order allows the reasoning process, particularly consistency maintenance, to operate locally.
